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The construction industry in the United States has experienced a
remarkable downturn in the past five years. In the mid 1980s, new
housing starts averaged nearly 1.8 million per year, slightly below the
record pace of 2 million per year in the late 1970s. By 1991, however, the
number of new housing starts was just above 1 million. The share of
GNP devoted to residential investment fell to 3.3 percent in 1991, the
second lowest level in the last three decades. Many factors contributed
to the recent decline in new construction, including changes in real and
nominal interest rates, a recession, and a sequence of tax reforms.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is frequently cited as a key contributor
to the recent construction decline, particularly the decline in multifamily
housing. One of the Act’s objectives was to reduce investment in tax
shelters, and rental housing had been one of the most active shelter
vehicles in the early 1980s. "Leveling the playing field," the mantra of
1986 tax reformers, required raising the tax burden on rental housing
relative to that on corporate capital. The view that the Tax Reform Act of
1986 is the source of the post-1986 real estate malaise underlies the
recent political pressure to repeal passive loss restrictions and several
other provisions in the Act and to provide new incentives for real estate
investment.
It is widely agreed that recent tax reforms have affected incentives
for housing consumption and for investment in rental properties.
Reductions in marginal tax rates have lowered the value of tax-exempt
imputed income for homeowners, with particularly large changes for
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high-income individuals, whose tax rates were 70 percent at the begin-
ning of the 1980s but are 28 percent today. Changes in the tax incentives
for investment in rental property have been even more dramatic. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 liberalized depreciation provisions
for rental property, while the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 reversed these changes. The net effect of all these
reforms has been a reduction in the tax incentives to rental construction.
This paper considers the link between recent tax changes and the
fortunes of the real estate industry. It investigates the extent to which
the effects of the various reforms were predicted, and the dimensions
along which actual events were a surprise. The paper is divided into five
sections. The first presents summary information on developments in
the real estate market in the past decade, placing the fluctuations in
housing starts and real estate prices into a broader historical context.
The next two sections describe the major provisions of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that
affected real estate. The fourth section surveys analyses of the tax reform
bills when they were enacted, as a guide to the expected effects of each
policy. The final section asks whether policy advisors can draw general
lessons about either the strengths or the weaknesses of economic
analysis of tax proposals from the recent experience.
New Construction in the 1980s
Housing has historically been one of the most volatile sectors of the
UoS. economy. The 1980s were unusually variable, however, particu-
larly for multifamily construction. Figure 1 plots the number of single-
family housing starts in each year since 1960, and it shows the well-
known volatility of the construction sector. Single-family starts peaked
at more than 1.4 million per year in 1977 and 1978, and averaged less
than 0.9 million per year for the 1990-91 period. The figure demon-
strates that while the decline in single-family starts since 1986 has been
substantial, it is not unprecedented. Even larger declines occurred
between 1972 and 1974 and between 1978 and 1981.
Figure 2 displays the time series for multifamily housing starts. The
strongest growth in multifamily construction took place in the early
1970s, largely as a result of major public housing initiatives. Multi-unit
starts declined sharply in the mid 1970s, tracked the overall economic
cycle of the late 1970s, and then surged in the early 1980s, arguably as a
result of important tax incentives in the 1981 law. Total multifamily
starts rose from 390,000 in 1981 to 670,000 in 1985, with virtually all of
the increase in large buildings (five or more units). The decline in
construction of rental housing, from more than 650,000 units per year in
1985 and 1986 to an average of 175,000 per year in 1991 and 1992 to date,232 James M. Poterba
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is much sharper than the drop in single-family starts. Excluding the
unusual period at the end of the public housing expansion, it is also the
largest contraction in multifamily construction during the past three
decades.
Figure 3 shows an alternative measure of the level of housing
activity, the share of residential investment in gross national product.
Residential investment includes some expenditures on additions and
alterations, as well as new construction outlays. The figure shows that
the share of GNP devoted to residential investment has declined by
more than one-third since 1986. Even with the residential investment
boom of the mid 1980s, residential investment as a share of GNP was
lower in the 1980s (4.5 per~cent) than in either of the previous decades
(4.7 percent in the 1960s, 5.0 percent in the 1970s).
While construction activity has declined, the frequent claim that the
United States has experienced a housing "bust" in the past five years,
with sharply declining prices, is exaggerated. Real house prices in some
regions have fallen by substantial amounts (Poterba 1991), but real
house prices for the nation as a whole have declined relatively little.
Figure 4 displays the real price of a constant-quality single-family home,
deflated to constant 1987 dollars using the personal consumption
deflator. Since 1986, real prices have declined by almost 7 percent, or at
the rate of approximately I percent per year. This experience is striking
only when contrasted with the pattern of real prices in the mid and late
1970s. Real single-family house prices rose by 30 percent between 1971
and 1979, in stark contrast to either the previous or the subsequent
decade. For households that extrapolated the experience of the 1970s,
however, the real decline in house prices during the last decade may
have seemed like a housing market "bust."
Data on prices of multifamily residential structures comparable to
the data on single-family homes are not available, unfortunately. Two
time series, however, do provide important information on the rental
housing market. The first is the vacancy rate for rental units, shown in
Figure 5. Important changes have occurred over time in the vacancy
rate. While it declined from the early 1960s through 1981, the rental
vacancy rate increased from 1981 through 1988. The change between 1984
and 1986, when the aggregate vacancy rate rose by 1.5 percentage
points, was the largest uptick in the vacancy rate during the past two
decades.
The vacancy rate for large rental properties, those with five or more
units, increased even more sharply than the average for all rental units,
from 6.5 percent in 1982 to 10.4 percent in 1986. This increase in vacancy
rates suggests an important degree of "overbuilding" in the early 1980s,
and represents an alternative to the tax-based explanation of the collapse
of rental housing construction in the late 1980s. It suggests instead that234 James M. Poterba
Figure 3










1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Source: National Income and Product Accounts.
Figure 4
Real Price of Constant-Quality
Single-Family Houses, 1963 to 1991







19~5     19~0     ld75 1~80     ld85     1~90
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census,TAX REFORM AND THE HOUSING MARKET IN THE LATE 1980S 235
Percent
Figure 5
Vacancy Rate for Rental Housing












Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
1975 1980 1985 1990
Figure 6










I I I I I I
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.236 James M. Poterba
the large expansion of the rental housing stock in the early 1980s,
possibly the result of tax incentives built into ERTA, could have
depressed new construction in the second half of the decade.
A second indicator of conditions in the rental housing market, and
one that calls the overbuilding hypothesis into question, is the level of
real rents. Figure 6 plots the real value of the implicit price deflator for
consumption of rental housing services, a price index drawn from the
National Income and Product Accounts, for the last three decades. This
index attempts to control for quality change in the rental housing stock.
The time series shows an increase in real rents during the first half of the
1980s, the period when the rental market was allegedly overbuilt, and a
slight decline in real rents during the period since 1987.1 This pattern is
inconsistent with the first-order prediction of most analyses of the two
major tax reforms in the 1980s, which suggested that the 1981 reform
would expand the supply of rental housing and reduce rents while the
1986 reform would constrict the supply and lead to rising real rents.
The Central Provisions of the Recent Tax Reforms
This section focuses on five of the most important elements of the
1981 and 1986 tax reforms.2
Marginal Tax Rates
Both tax reforms lowered personal income tax rates. Holding
constant the pretax interest rate at which households borrow and lend,
this raises the after-tax cost of homeownership. In 1980, the weighted-
average marginal federal tax rate on mortgage interest deductions for
those who claimed these deductions was 32 percent. By 1984, when the
rate reductions of 1981 had taken full effect, this average tax rate was 28
percent, and by 1988, the value had declined still further to 23 percent.3
Lower tax rates reduce the value of homeowners’ deductions for
mortgage interest payments and property taxes. Both tax reforms
should therefore have lowered the quantity of housing demanded by
some homeowners and, holding other factors constant, reduced home
1 Quality adjustment is a perennial issue of debate in constructing measures of real
rents. If the national income accounts deflator is replaced by the time series on real rents
from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Housing Reports Series H-130, which makes no
correction for quality change, the pattern of rising real rents in the early 1980s remains. For
this time series, the peak in real rents occurs in 1988, and real rents decline between 1988
and 1991.
2 This section and the following section draw heavily on the analysis in Poterba (1990).
~ These estimates were computed using the TAXSIM data base of the National Bureau
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prices. The downward price pressure should have been greatest for
high-priced homes, whose owners received the largest marginal rate
reductions. Some of these households also received higher after-tax
income as a result of the tax reform; this could have blunted the adverse
effects of higher user costs.
Standard Deductions
The 1986 reform also reduced the proportion of homeowners who
itemized their deductions, because it raised the value of the standard
deduction. This further reduced the effective tax subsidy to mortgage
interest (Poterba 1992). For a joint filer, the standard deduction rose
from $3670 to $5000. The average tax benefit to homeownership, and the
tax incentive to own rather than rent, depend on the total difference
between a household’s itemized deductions and its standard deduc-
tion.4 This difference falls when the standard deduction rises, further
reducing the incentive for lower- and middle-income households to
own their homes.
Depreciation Provisions
The 1981, 1984, and 1986 reforms affected tax depreciation benefits
for rental property and thereby changed the incentives for households
to own rather than rent their accommodations. Table I shows the recent
history of depreciation policy for rental property. ERTA shortened the
tax lifetime for residential rental property from 32 to 15 years (Hender-
Table 1
Depreciation Provisons for Residential Structures, 1969 to 1988
Lifetime Depreciation Schedule
1969-1981 32 Years 150% Declining Balance
1981-1984 15 Years 175% Declining Balance
1984-1985 18 Years 175% Declining Balance
1985-1986 19 Years 175% Declining Balance
1986- 27,5 Years Straight Line
Source: Author’s compilation based on U.S, Internal Revenue Code.
4 The marginal incentive to consume additional housing services depends on the
marginal tax rate at which the household can deduct further housing-related costs. This is
the focus of the traditional user cost analysis of housing demand, as in Poterba (1984) or
Rosen (1984).238 }ames M. Poterba
shott 1987). The 1986 Tax Reform Act reversed this policy, extending the
lifetime to 27.5 years and requiring straight-line depreciation rather than
the more accelerated 175 percent declining balance. The reduction in
marginal tax rates in 1981 partly counteracted the expanded depreciation
benefits in ERTA, but in 1986 less generous depreciation rules combined
with lower marginal tax rates to significantly reduce the value of
depreciation benefits. Since the present value of depreciation tax bene-
fits is a key consideration in rental investment decisions, these changes
should affect rental markets: real rents should increase because of the
1986 Tax Reform Act.
Tax depreciation rules cannot be evaluated without some reference
to prevailing economic conditions. When inflation rates are high and
nominal interest rates are above 10 percent, even relatively short
depreciation lives may yield net tax benefits that are smaller than those
of longer lifetimes in a lower-inflation environment. Hendershott (1987)
and Follain, Hendershott, and Ling (1992) emphasize that much of the
impetus for the tax changes in 1981 was the erosion in the value of
depreciation allowances that had resulted from the rapid inflation of the
late 1970s.
Capital Gains Tax Rates
Both major tax reforms affected capital gains tax rates, although in
opposite directions. ERTA reduced the marginal tax rate on long-term
capital gains for top-bracket investors from 28 percent to 20 percent,
while the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the distinction between
capital gains and other types of income and raised the top tax rate to 28
percent. The capital gains tax may have little effect on most homeowners
since the current $125,000 lifetime exclusion on taxation of housing gains
makes these gains untaxed except for households in top income brack-
ets, but the capital gains tax rate is potentially important in the rental
market. No tax exemption exists for capital gains on rental property, and
a substantial fraction of the returns to property investment often accrues
as capital gains.
The capital gains tax also has important effects on the incentive to
"churn" real property such as investments in rental units. When capital
gains taxes are low, the tax burden on the initial owner of the asset is
reduced and the incentives for churning are greater (Hendershott and
Ling 1984; Gordon, Hines, and Summers 1987). The capital gains tax
reduction in ERTA therefore enhanced the depreciation benefits pro-
vided by that tax reform, encouraging rapid growth in rental construc-
tion. The higher capital gains tax rates in 1986 similarly augmented the
changes in depreciation rules to reduce the incentives for investing in
rental properties.TAX REFORM AND THE HOUSING MARKET IN THE LATE 1980S 239
Anti-Shelter Provisions
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 included several provisions designed to
restrict tax shelter investments, including rental properties. The most
important restrictions were passive loss limitations. Prior to 1986,
investors in rental properties that generated tax losses could use these
losses to shelter other income from taxation. The 1986 Act restricted this
practice, allowing only other passive income to be offset by passive
losses.5 This provision limited the loss offset available on unprofitable
rental projects, and it also discouraged high-leverage rental projects that
were canonical "tax shelter" investments. These investments typically
generated losses in their first few years of operations, as rental income
failed to cover the high interest payouts and tax depreciation associated
with the project. The income from these shelter investments would
accrue as capital gains in later years. Prior to the passive loss limitations,
investors could shelter current ordinary income with accruing tax losses,
deferring realization of income until the sale of the property and
obtaining preferential capital gains tax treatment. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 reduced the appeal of these investments along several dimensions
by changing capital gains tax rates, loss-offset provisions, and the flow
of depreciation allowances.
The anti-shelter provisions in the 1986 Act worked. Real estate
partnership sales declined 37 percent between 1985 and 1988, and more
than 90 percent between 1985 and 1991. Real-estate-related partnerships
accounted for over 55 percent of new partnership sales before the 1986
Tax Reform Act, but only 44 percent in 1988 and 37 percent in 1991.6
Other Provisions
Many other tax provisions in both ERTA and the 1986 Act affected
housing markets. The removal of amortization of interest on "’builder
bonds" and limits on tax-exempt financing for housing projects in the
1986 Tax Reform Act raised the costs of building new rental properties.
Changes in the minimum tax affected the marginal cost of additional
housing services for high-income households, and could also have
altered their incentives for investing in rental properties.
Other tax provisions affected particular types of housing, for
example, rental properties for low-income households. The 1986 change
in depreciation benefits for such housing was even more dramatic than
5 Special provisions apply to passive losses of landlords with adjusted gross incomes
below $100,000. These landlords may deduct $25,000 in passive losses against other
income.
6 Information on sales of real estate and other partnerships was provided by Robert A.
Stanger and Company.240 James M. Poterba
that for other rental housing, with a switch from double-declining
balance depreciation on a 15-year lifetime to straight-line depreciation
on a 27.5-year life. Most of the discussion at the time of the tax reforms,
however, focused on general purpose rental housing.7
Estimating the Effects of Tax Changes
on Housing Markets
The net effect Of the tax code on incentives for owning a home
rather than renting and for housing consumption can be formalized by
computing the after-tax user costs of owner-occupied and rental housing
under various tax regimes. The user cost of homeownership measures
the marginal cost of an incremental unit (say another 100 square feet of
living space) of owner-occupied housing, including the forgone return
on the owner’s equity. The user cost for rental property reflects the
landlord’s cost of investing in the property; in equilibrium, the landlord
must earn rents equal to his user cost. A brief Appendix describes the
specification of the user costs and the choice of various parameters for
evaluating these costs.
Table 2 shows estimates of the user cost of homeownership for
three households at various times during the past decade. The first
panel considers the user cost for fixed rates of interest and expected
inflation, thereby highlighting the effect of tax changes. The second
panel evaluates the tax code of each year using interest and expected
inflation rates that prevailed at that time, thus indicating the net change
in incentives for homeownership.
The results illustrate that recent reforms had their most pronounced
effect on the cost of homeownership for high-income households. For a
family with adjusted gross income (AGI) of $250,000 in 1988, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 lowered the marginal tax rate from 50 percent to 28
percent and raised the user cost of homeownership from 0.094 to 0.114,
assuming an interest rate of 7 percent and a 3 percent expected inflation
rate. The 1986 tax reform would have needed to reduce the real interest
rate by nearly 300 basis points to offset this effect. The actual change in
the user cost of homeownership since 1986, recognizing variations in
interest rates and inflationary expectations, was an increase from 0.074
to 0.095 for this household. Assuming a price elasticity of demand of
7 One of the potential lessons of the 1980s tax reform experience is that specialized tax
provisions that affect relatively few taxpayers can actually have important effects on
aggregate investment activity. The tax returns of high-income households are complex and
are often affected by changes in relatively obscure tax rules. High-income taxpayers may,
however, account for an important share of the investment flow to some activities.TAX REFORM AND THE HOUSING MARKET IN THE LATE 1980S 241
Table 2
Estimated User Costs of Owner-Occupied and Rental Property, 1980 to 1988
1980     1982     1984     1986     1988
Case 1: Fixed Parameters: Interest Rate = 7 percent, Expected Inflation Rate = 3 percent
User Cost of Homeownership
1988 AGI = $ 25,000 .120 .122 .125 .125 .126
1988 AGI = $ 45,000 .110 .113 .117 .117 .114
1988 AGI = $250,000 .081 .094 .094 .094 .114
Rental User Cost .126a .116 .117 .118 .132
Case 2: Prevailing Interest and Inflation Rates
User Cost of Homeownership
1988 AGI = $ 25,000 .080 .094 .098 .115 .109
1988 AGI = $ 45,000 .064 .077 .089 ,104 ,095
1988 AGI = $250,000 ,017 .042 .049 .074 .095
Rental User Cost ,096 .096 .104 .137 .149
Parameter Values
Nominal Interest Rate ,127 .151 .124 .103 .091
Expected Inflation Rate ,085 .093 .072 .037 .034
Notes: AGI = adjusted gross income. Calculations for both cases assume "r# = ,02, ~ = .014, o~ = .04,
and m = ,025, Rental user costs assume no churning, with marginal tax rates for the rental landlord of
50 percent in 1980-1986 and 28 percent in 1988.
aThis entry for 1980 is notable because it does not assume the highest possible marginal tax rate for the
rental landlord; it assumes a 50 percent rather than a 70 percent marginal rate, At the 70 percent rate.
this value would be 0.117, See the Appendix, or Poterba (1990), for a more detailed discussion.
-1.0 for owner-occupied housing (Rosen 1984), this tax change could
have large effects on both demand and house prices. Simulation
evidence, such as that in Poterba (1984), suggests that such changes
could induce a 10 percent decline in real house prices for the homes
typically demanded by very high-income households. The change after
1986 for these households is small, however, relative to the change from
the beginning of the 1980s, when the estimated user cost was 0.017.8
The effect of rate reductions on homeownership incentives for those
in lower income brackets is much smaller, since the decline in tax rates
in the 1986 reform was less pronounced. For the household with an
adjusted gross income of $25,000 in 1988, the tax reform lowered the
marginal tax rate from 16 percent to 15 percent and raised the user cost
(in the benchmark case) from 0.125 to 0.126. Some middle-income
households, such as the $45,000 example presented here, even experi-
enced increases in their marginal tax rates, and for them housing costs
a The estimates for the early 1980s probably understate the user costs that households
considered in their housing decisions, because households did not expect the low user cost
of 1980 to prevail forever. This would make them reluctant to pay as much for a home as
this user cost would suggest, since higher future user costs would lead to capital losses.242 James M. Poterba
declined. Hausman and Poterba (1987) found that only 59 percent of
taxpayers would receive tax rate reductions as a result of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
The results in the lower panel of Table 2 show that the combination
of high expected inflation rates and high marginal tax rates at the
beginning of the 1980s made user costs relatively low, particularly for
high-income households. For the household with an adjusted gross
income of $45,000 in 1988, the user cost of homeownership increased
nearly 50 percentNfrom 0.064 to 0.095--during the eight years following
1980. This reflects rising real interest rates as well as the decline in tax
incentives.
Table 2 also shows the user costs of rental housing. Assuming that
the marginal supplier of rental units was an individual in the top
marginal tax bracket, the rental user cost rose from 0.137 to 0.149, or 9
percent, between 1986 and 1988. The increase would have been larger if
the real interest rate had not declined during this period, and in the case
of constant interest and inflation rates, the rental user cost rises by 12
percent. These calculations almost certainly understate the effect of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 in raising rental user costs, because they do not
incorporate the changes in passive loss rules, the at-risk regulations, or
the possibility (before 1986) of depreciating the same property multiple
times.
The table also provides evidence on the effect of ERTA on rental
user costs. If the nominal interest rate and expected inflation rate had
been at their 1980 levels in 1982, rental user costs would have declined
from 0.096 (assuming a landlord tax rate of 50 percent in 1980) to 0.089,
a decline of 7.3 percent. The increase in real interest rates between 1980
and 1982, however, counteracted this effect so the reported user costs in
the lower panel of Table 2 show virtually no change.9 These calculations
probably understate the favorable effect of the 1981 law, however,
because they do not incorporate the churning of these assets.
The calculations in Table 2 are partial-equilibrium in nature, so they
ignore the changes in the tax treatment of other assets in both the 1981
and 1986 tax reforms. These changes can affect the housing market by
changing the required return on all investments, that is, by altering the
interest rate that enters the housing user cost. General equilibrium
simulations of the type performed by Hendershott (1987) and others are
needed to aggregate the different tax changes for different assets into
predictions for the housing market, but they generally yield results
similar to those reported here.
9 If the marginal investor in rental property in 1980 was in the 70 percent tax bracket,
then the net change from 1980 to 1982 is an increase in rental user costs since the reduction
in the landlord’s tax rate outweighs the increasingly generous depreciation provisions.TAX REFORM AND THE HOUSING MARKET IN THE LATE 1980S 243
What Did Experts Think the Tax Reforms Would Do?
This section provides some evidence on the prevailing perceptions
and beliefs when the two major tax reforms of the 1980s were enacted.
Because real estate provisions were debated as a central component of
the 1986 reform, the discussion begins with the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
and then turns briefly to beliefs in 1981, when the Economic Recovery
Tax Act was enacted.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The majority of policy analysts who reviewed the proposals leading
up to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, as well as the Act itself, viewed the
reform as anti-housing. There was little doubt that the reform would
reduce incentives for rental housing construction,1° but less agreement
on~ the implications for the owner-occupied housing market.
The reduction in rental housing incentives in the 1986 tax reform
was largely by design. One of the central objectives of the advocates of
tax reform was to eliminate abuses of the tax system, particularly tax
shelters. The Treasury report that started the tax reform process, the
President’s 1985 proposals, and much of the rhetoric that supported the
Act berated shelters. Investments in sheltering assets enabled high-
income taxpayers to avoid paying their "fair share" of taxes, and this
was considered a central problem of the existing tax code.
In part as a result of the 1981 tax reform, the volume of tax shelter
activity increased sharply in the early 1980s. New public offerings of
partnerships grew from $38 billion in 1979 to $64 billion in 1982, with oil
and gas and real estate partnerships the two most important types from
the standpoint of tax policy (Steuerle 1992).
The objective of limiting tax shelter investments was implemented
in many different ways. The Joint Committee on Taxation document
(1987) describing the provisions of the Tax Reform Act, which includes
sections on "Reasons for Change" associated with each provision, cites
the need to reduce real estate tax shelters as part of the rationale for
limitations on passive loss offsets, changes in at-risk rules, and modifi-
cations of the depreciation schedule for rental property.
The notion that reducing tax shelter activity would reduce housing
investment was also understood, although not emphasized, in the
policy debate. The Joint Committee on Taxation (1987, p. 98) wrote in its
justification for changing the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS):
10 One notable exception to the near consensus on the detrimental effects of tax reform
on rental housing was Gravelle’s (1985) analysis, which argued that corporations, not
individuals, were the "’marginal investors" in rental housing projects. Events since 1986
have cast doubt on this view of the rental housing market.244 James M. Poterba
¯ .. too much investment occurred in tax-favored sectors, and too little
investment occurred in sectors that were more productive but which were
tax-disadvantaged. The nation’s output can be increased simply by a reallo-
cation of investment ....
This general discussion of the long-run benefits of equalizing tax
burdens across industries and assets was typical of the analysis sur-
rounding the 1986 Tax Reform Act. With respect to rental housing, the
most commonly debated "summary statistic" for the reform was its
effect on real rents. Follain, Hendershott, and Ling (1987), for example,
concluded that real rents were likely to increase by between 6 and 10
percent. Their findings are representative of the results from discounted
rental project models, which were widely used in analyzing the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
Few analysts drew the link, however, between reduced incentives
for housing investment, rising real rents in the long run, and the
short-run decline in construction and asset values. A notable exception is
the National Association of Home Builders (1986) assessment of the
consequences of the Tax Reform Act, which claimed (pp. 4 & 5):
The decline in multifamily starts may be as large as one-third from the already
reduced levels of 1986, or about 200,000 units. The decline in resale values
may also be significant .... Even if rents for a building are expected to rise
soon, current resale value could fall by 10 to 20%.
Relatively few studies called attention to this consequence of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, but the basic result was implicit in virtually all of
them. Raising rents requires a reduction in the rental housing stock,
which in turn requires a reduction in construction relative to what it
otherwise would have been.
Analyses of the effects of the Act on owner-occupied housing were
less consistent than studies of the rental housing provisions. This
reflected both the conflicting incentive effects in the reform legislation
and the importance of general equilibrium effects in determining how
the tax bill would affect homeowners. If the tax reform significantly
reduced real interest rates, as some studies suggested it would, then the
increase in after-tax homeowner costs from marginal rate reductions
could be offset by lower borrowing costs.11 If the reform did not change
interest rates, however, it would reduce the demand for owner-occu-
11 One of the central features of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was an increase in effective
tax burdens on new investment, financed in part by a reduction in taxes on existing assets.
When the tax rate on corporate capital rises, some of this tax can be "shifted back" to
investors in the form of lower real returns. This effect is a subject of empirical controversy
because its magnitude depends on the degree of integration of world capital markets, the
substitutability of corporate and other capital, and many other parameter values.TAX REFORM AND THE HOUSING MARKET IN THE LATE 1980S 245
pied housing at high incomes and have varied effects at lower incomes
depending on a household’s particular circumstances.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
Housing was not a central focus of the reform debate leading up to
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. There was general concern that
the high inflation rates of the late 1970s had eroded the real value of
depreciation allowances on physical investments, but most of the
attention focused on business investment, not real estate. 12 The gener-
ous real estate provisions of the 1981 law actually generated backlash in
subsequent years, even before the watershed changes of 1986. The
depreciation lives for rental real estate were extended in the Tax Equity
and Financial Responsibility Act (1982) and in the 1984 tax bill, suggest-
ing that the generous treatment of real estate in 1981 may have been
partly an accident.
The effects of the 1981 reforms on owner-occupied housing also
received relatively little discussion in the policy debate. Lowering
marginal tax rates substantially increased the real cost of homeowner-
ship for many households. As in the analysis of the 1986 Act, however,
the precise magnitude of these effects was sensitive to assumptions
about how the overall reform would affect interest rates.13
Lessons for Poticymaking
The discussion in the previous section suggests that the adverse
effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on rental housing construction should
come as no surprise to those who followed the commentary leading up
to the tax change. In fact, shifting investment from real estate to
corporate capital was one of the objectives of the reform. The magnitude
of the multifamily housing collapse may, however, have surprised some
analysts. This section identifies several systematic features of the policy
process that did not emphasize, or understated, the potential adverse
effects of the 1986 reform on the level of construction activity.14
12 See Steuerle (1992) for a summary of the policy debate.
~ One issue of controversy, at least after the 1981 tax law was enacted, was how this
bill affected the incentives for owning rather than renting housing. The 1981 act reduced
the marginal tax rate applicable to top-bracket rental landlords, which would raise the
required rent on new rental projects, other things equal. It also provided more accelerated
depreciation and, if investors "churned" their properties, this effect could overwhelm the
tax rate changes. Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987) discuss these issues in detail.
14 This section does not address the analytic inputs to the 1981 tax reform in any detail,
since I have argued above that the generous provisions toward real estate seemed more
accidental than intended.246 James M. Poterba
Short-Run Construction Levels Not a Focus of Policy Studies
The central objectives of the 1986 reform movement were reducing
tax rates on individuals and equalizing effective tax rates across different
industries and asset classes. The disparities between the effective tax
rates on general industrial machinery and on buildings, for example,
were widely cited as an inefficiency of the post-ERTA tax system that
could induce misallocation of capital. Most of the academic and policy
research leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 therefore focused on
measuring effective tax rates. Armed with a set of effective tax rates, a
few simple assumptions, and a production function, it is a straightfor-
ward exercise to compute the long-run change in the composition of the
capital stock following a tax policy change. The estimated changes in
capital stock can be used to compute the efficiency gains relative to a
more distorted economy. Many studies did just that, and pointed out
that the long-run stock of rental housing would decline as a conse-
quence of the tax reform.
The focus on effective tax rates and efficiency gains drew attention
away from analysis of the short-run investment response to tax reform.
Policy analysts may not have dwelt on the short-run dynamics in part
because most of the models used to analyze the tax reform and its
efficiency effects lack a well-calibrated model of new construction.
Steady states can be described more easily than transition paths, and as
a result, the vocabulary of the policy debate largely omitted short-run
adjustment issues.
A number of examples illustrate the lack of information on short-
run adjustments. Follain, Hendershott, and Ling (1987) argued that
their predicted rise in real rents could occur over horizons of between
three and 10 years, depending on the conditions in the local housing
market. Goulder and Summers (1987) developed a computational gen-
eral equilibrium model in which the behavioral equation for the supply
of multifamily housing was based on the single-family investment
supply equation in Poterba (1984). Their model reflects the lack of
systematic empirical evidence on the links between public policies,
rental market conditions, and the level of new construction. Even the
short-run dynamics of the single-family housing market are controver-
sial, as Topel and Rosen (1988) emphasize in their study of how capital
can flow into and out of the construction sector.
Most studies of how the 1986 tax changes would affect the housing
market implied a substantial rise in rents (say 10 percent) and an
associated decline in rental construction. Assuming a price elasticity of
demand for rental housing of -1.0, a 10 percent rent increase would
require a 10 percent decline in the real stock of rental housing. If
effective demand grows at about 2 percent per year because of popula-
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stock is 1 percent each year, the required adjustment could be achieved
with just over three years of no new building. With some new building
taking place, the depression in new construction could last significantly
longer. The models were typically calibrated for the nation, and they
were consistent with much sharper declines in new construction in
some regions, where the rate of demand growth was below the national
average.
Anti-Tax-Shelter Fever
A second factor that made it difficult to predict the effect of the Tax
Reform Act, in this case for both the long and the short run, was the
presence of overlapping and often complex provisions that reduced the
incentives for rental housing construction. These resulted from a desire
to make sure the reform succeeded in reducing the amount of tax shelter
investment.
The rental project analyses that evaluated the legislative proposals
leading up to the 1986 tax changes, like those of user costs described
above, incorporated changes in depreciation lifetimes, tax rates on rental
landlords, and in some cases changes in capital gains taxes.15 They often
ignored the effects of limits on passive losses, at-risk regulations, and
most of the tax changes affecting builders. These omissions were largely
due to the difficulty of incorporating these reforms in the standard
framework for analyzing tax policies. In this case, a sequence of different
reforms operated in the same direction to reduce the attraction of
investing in rental projects.
Some studies of effective tax rates may not have captured the full
effect of these changes because the models did not reflect the peculiar-
ities of residential real estate investments. Gordon, Hines, and Summers
(1987) and Scholes and Wolfson (1991) argue, for example, that "churn-
ing," the process of depreciating a property several times by reselling it,
was potentially very important in increasing the present discounted
value of depreciation deductions on rental properties under ERTA. Yet
many analyses did not consider churning, focusing instead on the case
in which properties are depreciated a single time.
Other issues of specification in effective tax rate calculations masked
the effects on real estate. For example, real estate assets can usually bear
more debt than other assets. In some computational general-equilibrium
models, the mix of debt and equity does not vary across industries or
~s Capital gains taxes are difficult to incorporate in the standard rental project analysis,
because realization decisions are endogenous. Rental project investors may pursue various
tax-minimizing strategies that reduce their effective capital gains tax burden below the
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asset types. Such models could substantially misstate the increase in tax
burdens from the Tax Reform Act for high-debt activities, since the value
of interest deductions fell along with changes in investor marginal tax
rates.
Hitting a Market When It Is Down
The depth of the contraction in rental housing construction in the
late 1980s is difficult to blame entirely on the 1986 Tax Reform Act.16
Signs were clear even before the legislation was enacted that the rental real
estate market for both apartments and office buildings was weakening.
Yet little discussion took place about the short-run distributional or
adjustment effects associated with the reduction in tax benefits for real
estate. 17
The signs of trouble in real estate were easy to see. In February
1986, for example, The Stanger Report, a newsletter on limited partner-
ship activities, reported (p.1):
Problems in real estate syndications are on the rise. This year, you’ll see some
big name syndicators.., begin to bleed from overbuilding in office markets,
depressed economies in energy-industry cities, and the challenge of spend-
ing wisely the huge increase in partnership funding since 1980.
The vacancy rate for rental units in large rental buildings, those with five
or more units, increased from 7.1 percent to 10.4 percent between the
second quarter of 1984 and the second quarter of 1986. Vacancy rates
above 10 percent were virtually unprecedented in this market, and a
savvy analyst would have predicted in early 1986 that new construction
would decline even without changes in tax provisions.18
The vocabulary of the tax reform debate did not encourage analysts
to consider the current state of the real estate market. Instead, much of
the discussion centered on comparisons of steady states, where calibra-
tion was often based on aggregate national data averaged over periods
of several decades. While they included numerous descriptions of the
winners and losers from tax reform, these discussions were rarely
16 Hendershott and Kane (1992) provide a careful analysis of the factors leading to the
collapse in both rents and new construction in the office market. They identify tax
changes, high real interest rates, and the recent recession as contributory factors in the
office market decline. Similar arguments can be applied to the rental housing market.
lz This is not to suggest that the efficiency objectives of the reform were not laudable,
or that they did not outweigh the potential short-run costs of reductions in rental
construction.
1~ These vacancy rates were occasionally noted in the tax reform discussion, usually as
evidence that the post-ERTA tax rules had led to overbuilding and inefficient capital
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integrated with the changes already taking place in various markets and
industries.
Subtle Influences of Tax Reform on Financial Institutions
Ex post analysis of any legislation as complex as the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 is bound to reveal effects that were overlooked or not considered
in sufficient detail. The most prominent example in this case is the
impact of tax reform on the balance sheets of financial institutions, and
the resulting consequences for the supply of funds to new investment.
While the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was only one of the factors contrib-
uting to the fall in property values for rental residential and commercial
real estate, the late 1980s demonstrated that changes in existing asset
values could have important effects on investment in new assets. This
position runs counter to the usual public finance analysis, which views
taxes that reduce the value of existing assets as a non-distorting way to
raise revenue.19
The complexity in this case arose from the leverage of existing assets
and the role of these assets in supporting loans to new projects. Tax and
other factors that reduced asset values weakened the balance sheets of
lending institutions. In extreme cases, thrifts and other institutions
became insolvent and were reorganized as part of the federal bailout.
Even in less extreme situations, however, falling property values re-
duced the ability of lenders to commit funds for new projects.
Calibrating the links between existing tax policies, asset values, the
health of financial institutions, and the cost of funds for new investment
is a major research project. The limited discussion of these links in the
1986 tax reform discussion, the potential importance of these channels
for public policy influence in the subsequent years, and the increased
research attention to these issues at present, provide an important
example of how the art and science of public policy analysis move
forward.
19 Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) survey tax incidence and highlight the role of taxes in
affecting "old" versus "new" capital.250 James M. Poterba
Appendix: The User Costs of Owner-Occupied and Rental Housing
The user cost of homeownership is defined as
(A.1)             co = [(1 - O)(i + rp) +
where i is the the nominal interest rate, rp is the property tax rate per dollar of property
value, 0 is the household’s marginal federal income tax rate, 3 is the physical decay rate
for the property, a is the risk premium for housing investments, m is the cost of home
maintenance as a fraction of house value, ~re is the expected rate of house price
appreciation, and Po is the real price of owner-occupied housing.2° Equation (A. 1) applies
to taxpayers who itemize. For non-itemizers, (1 - r)i is replaced by [(1 - a)(1 - r) + ;qi,
where ~ is the loan-to-value ratio for the house.
The user cost for rental property is
(A.2) cr = {[(1 - r)i + 3 + a - ¢re](1 - ~’* z)/(1 - r) + ~’p + m}Pr
where the parameters not defined above are ~’, the marginal income tax rate of the rental
landlord, Pr, the real price of rental property, and z, the present value of tax depreciation
allowances.~1 In equilibrium the rent charged must equal c r so that the landlord is willing
to hold the rental property. Poterba (1990) discusses the choice of parameters for
calculating the owner and rental user costs in more detail.
20 This equation assumes that all capital gains on owner-occupied dwellings are
untaxed. If gains are taxed, ~r~ would be replaced with (1 - rg)~re where ~-g is the effective
capital gains tax rate. The equation also assumes that households face identical borrowing
and lending rates.
21 If the government does not completely share the risks with private investors, as
it may not if loss offsets are limited, the term in (A.2) would no longer be multiplied
by (1 - r,z)/(1 - r).TAX REFORM AND THE HOUSING MARKET IN THE LATE 1980S 251
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Martin Feldstein*
James Poterba’s paper is about the unexpected consequences of
government actions, particularly about the effects of the tax changes of
the 1980s on the housing market. Poterba has been a long-time student
of the effects of taxation on real estate. He understands the complex
ways in which tax rules and inflation interact to influence the prices of,
and the demand for, both owner-occupied housing and multifamily
rental housing. He has built on this expertise to raise important
questions about the short-term macroeconomic effects of the tax changes
of the 1980s.
Interaction of Inflation and Tax Rules
Since this is a Federal Reserve conference, it is particularly impor-
tant to emphasize the fact that it was the decline in the rate of inflation
that really caused the changes in effective tax rates on residential capital
in the 1980s. The success of the Federal Reserve in reducing the rate of
inflation had a much bigger effect on the real user cost of capital, for both
homeowners and owners of rental property, than did the legislated
changes in the tax law itself. It is because tax rules ignore inflation, and
base tax obligations on nominal receipts and nominal costs, that the
decline of inflation caused substantial changes in the real user cost of
capital.
So taxes matter in an important way, but it was the changes in the
*Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.DISCUSSION 253
inflation rate in an economy with nominal tax rules that caused the
important changes in the real user cost of residential capital. Lower
inflation helped to reduce the bias toward excess investment in owner-
occupied housing relative to nonresidential capital, but also tilted the
incentives strongly away from renting and in favor of owning.
To see this more concretely, consider first the effect on the user cost
of capital for middle-income homeowners (those with $45,000 adjusted
gross income in 1988 dollars). Their user cost of homeownership capital
rose from 6.4 percent in 1980 to 9.5 percent in 1988, an increase of 3.1
percentage points. (See Poterba’s Table 2.) But if the inflation rate and
interest rate had remained unchanged, the rise in the user cost of home-
ownership capital would have been negligible, only 0.4 percentage points.
Only for very high-income taxpayers did the changes in tax rules
have any significant effect, and even for them the effect is much smaller
than the effect due to the fall in inflation and nominal interest rates. The
user cost of capital for high-income homeowners (those with $250,000
adjusted gross income in 1988 dollars) rose from 1.7 percent in 1980 to
9.5 percent in 1988, but less than half of this 7.8 percentage point
increase was due to the tax rule changes alone. Poterba’s calculations
show that with fixed interest rates and inflation, the rise in the user cost
of capital for those same homeowners was only 3.3 percentage points,
from 8.1 percent to 11.4 percent. Thus, while the actual user cost rose
nearly 500 percent, the rise due to the tax change alone was only 40
percent.
The user cost of capital for rental housing also rose in the 1980s,
increasing from 9.6 percent in 1980 to 14.9 percent. For a family with a
$45,000 income (adjusted gross income in 1988 dollars) that faced the
choice between renting and owning, the user cost of capital for home-
ownership fell from about 17 percent below the user cost of capital
reflected in rental housing in 1980 to nearly 40 percent below the user
cost of rental capital in 1988. The distortion in the rental-ownership
decision for such taxpayers in 1980 was significant, and by 1988 the bias
in favor of home ownership was much greater.
These figures make it clear that the most important changes in the
user cost of capital for residential real estate in the 1980s were due not to
the tax legislation but to the Federal Reserve’s successful policy of
reducing inflation. To the extent that unexpected changes occurred in
the real estate market in the 1980s, they should be attributed to the
change in inflation rather than to the changes in tax rates and depreci-
ation rules. 1
This experience should also be a useful reminder to those macro-
1 An exception to this was the changes in rules affecting tax shelter investments in real
estate. These are not reflected in Poterba’s Table 2 calculations. I will return to this below.254 Martin Feldstein
economists who persist in talking about the neutrality of inflation or the
neutrality of changes in money growth. In every major economy in the
world, tax rules interact with inflation in ways that cause changes in
inflation to have powerful effects on incentives to invest and to save.2
Short-Run Effects on Aggregate Demand
Since the changes in tax rates and depreciation rules had very little
effect on the user cost of capital for either homeowner or rental property,
it should not be surprising that analysts paid relatively little attention to
the short-run macroeconomic effects of the reforms. Of course, even a
small change in the incentive to invest would have some effect, and
these effects were in fact noted at the time.
Within a few months after the October 1986 passage of the Tax
Reform Act, the Council of Economic Advisers was noting (in its 1987
Report, p. 93) that the "TRA will slow the growth of investment to a
modest extent as the capital stock adjusts to its new long-run equilib-
rium growth path. Hence, unless consumption or net exports takes up
the slack, aggregate demand growth will be dampened somewhat." In
fact, weakness of aggregate demand was not a problem in either 1986 or
the next few years. Real GDP rose at above-trend rates throughout the
period, and the unemployment rate fell from 7.1 percent in 1985 to 6.9
percent in 1986, 6.1 percent in 1987, and 5.4 percent in 1988.
Despite the sharp fall in multifamily housh~g starts, total real residen-
tial investment remained essentially unchanged. The National Income and
Product Accounts report that residential investment in 1987 dollars actually
rose from $202 billion in 1985 to $226 billion in 1986 and then stabilized at
that level ($225 billion in 1987 and $223 billion in 1988). Employment in
construction continued to expand throughout the period, rising from 4.7
million workers on construction payrolls in 1985 to 4.8 million in 1986,
5.0 million in 1987, and 5.1 million in 1988. The average wage of
construction workers remained 18 percent higher than average manu-
facturing wages from 1986 until at least the end of the decade.
Tax Shelter Investments in Real Estate
Although the changes in tax rates and depreciation rules had very
little effect on the incentive to invest in real estate, the special changes in
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 targeted at tax shelter investments in real
estate did have a dramatic effect on the attractiveness of such invest-
These issues are explored in a number of papers collected in Feldstein (1983).DISCUSSION 255
ments. The new "passive loss" rules that stopped individuals from
reducing total taxable income by offsetting the losses on such real estate
investments against other income essentially stopped all such high-
leverage tax shelter investments in real estate.3
The Treasury economists and outside academic economists who
participated in the tax reform analysis were less concerned with these
tax shelter changes than with the effects of the basic changes in tax rates
and depreciation rules. But the potential macroeconomic effect of the
change in tax shelter rules was not ignored. The 1987 Economic Report of
the President notes (p. 95): "Construction in particular will be adversely
affected because the new tax rules will limit the ability of individuals to
deduct net losses on investments in commercial structures and rental
housing in exchange for later capital gains. These provisions of TRA
have probably contributed to the recent slowdown in the construction
industry .... Multifamily housing starts in 1986 were down 12 percent
from the pace of 1985."
Effects on Financial Institutions
Although aggregate demand and even construction activity contin-
ued at a healthy pace in the years after the enactment of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, the changes in the tax shelter rules probably contributed
significantly to the troubles of the financial institutions in the second
half of the 1980s. The high inflation rates and favorable depreciation
rules had led to an overbuilding of all types of rental property in the first
half of the 1980s. This was encouraged also by thrift institutions that
were looking for opportunities to substantially expand their lending.
They hoped to "grow their way out" of their financial problems with the
help of brokered deposits, after Congress in 1980 raised the insurance
coverage to $100,000 per account, the deposit size at which interest rates
were no longer subject to Regulation Q restrictions.4
3 Note that the tax losses in tax shelter investments were the excess of interest
payments and depreciation over rental income. Although the interest payments were
actual cash outlays, the depreciation costs were not. A real estate investment could
therefore have a positive cash flow even though it showed an accounting loss.
The difference between the actual value of the property and its depreciated book value
would in principle be recognized as a taxable capital gain when the property was
eventually sold, but there was no reason to expect the property to be sold at any time in
the twentieth century. If the investor died before the property was sold, the capital gains
obligation accrued through that date would be forgiven. The 1986 rise in the capital gains
tax rate therefore had no material effect on the attractiveness of new tax shelter investments.
The use of real estate investments as tax shelters was killed by the change in passive loss
rules and by the reduction of the top marginal tax rate from 50 percent to 28 percent.
4 On the disastrous effects of the congressional decision to raise the insurance
coverage to $100,000, see Sprague (1991).256 Martin Feldstein
The excess building would probably have caused a glut by the late
1980s, leading to falling asset values and declining rents. To the extent
that the tax changes and the decline in inflation reduced the incentive to
invest, the excess supply was actually reduced somewhat, and rents fell
more slowly than they otherwise would have.
But the retroactive character of the changes in the tax shelter rules
reinforced the decline in real estate prices and weakened financial
institutions. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provided that passive losses on
past investments would be phased out rapidly over five years. After
1986, an existing multifamily housing investment that was previously
expected to generate tax losses for another 15 years would have
deductible losses for only five more years, with the loss in each of those
years scaled down by 20 percent. For most of the limited partners in the
partnerships that owned the tax shelter real estate, the best thing to do
was to sell the property at once. Dumping this property--primarily
multifamily housing, hotels, office buildings--onto the property market
caused a fall in their prices.
Such a retroactive change in tax rules could of course produce no
gain in the efficiency of investment, since the property already existed.
All of the gain in investment efficiency could have been achieved by
eliminating the use of passive losses on new investments undertaken
after the enactment of the tax reform legislation. The passive losses were
eliminated retroactively to raise revenue, and particularly to raise
revenue from the high-income taxpayers who would have the largest tax
rate reductions (even though they benefited less from the tax change
than high-income taxpayers who had not previously used tax shelters).
The Treasury and the Congress were eager to characterize the tax reform
as giving relatively greater tax cuts to those with moderate and low
incomes and "closing loopholes for the rich." Although the debate
about the Tax Reform Act of 1986 focused a great deal on the conse-
quences of the legislation for individuals classified by income class, no
attempt was made to take into account the capital losses that would
result from this retroactive change in the tax treatment of existing real
estate investments.5
5 That was, of course, only one example of the improper distributiohal analysis that
received so much attention. By ignoring the effect of the increase in the corporate tax rate,
supporters of the Tax Act were able to show that a supposedly revenue-neutral reform
would reduce taxes in every income bracket. Feldstein (1988) shows that imputing that tax
increase to the owners of capital implied a substantial tax increase for upper-income
taxpayers. Another of the great bits of chicanery in the distributional analysis of the 1986
Tax Reform Act was taking "feedback" effects of the higher capital gains tax rates into
account in calculating total revenue consequences but ignoring them in calculating the
distribution of tax changes by income class.DISCUSSION 257
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Richard A. Musgrave*
Throughout the history of income taxation, tax law has favored real
estate, and the playing field for investment has been tilted in its favor.
This bias was increased by the 1981 tax legislation. Then, in 1986, the
level of tax preference was reduced considerably, perhaps to the level
that existed before 1981, but certainly not down to an even playing field.
Assessing the Tax Effect
Conventional economic analysis would tell us that the 1981 legisla-
tion should have encouraged construction activity and pushed up real
estate prices, and that the 1986 legislation should have done the
opposite. James Poterba concludes that this view is "arguably" accurate,
and that the 1981 legislation contributed to the rise in construction of
multifamily housing, That is a rather careful way of phrasing it, and I
can understand his caution. Isolating the effect of the tax factor and
assessing the weight of its contribution are difficult.
First, many different forces were at work during the 1980s, includ-
ing declining real wages, rising real interest rates, and changes in the
structure of financial markets and institutions. Many factors could be
offered as explanations of the changes that occurred in real estate
markets, without involving taxes. Second, to determine the true influ-
ence of the tax factor, one must attempt to specify the counter-factual. In
other words, to determine the effects of the Economic Recovery Tax Act
*H. H. Burbank Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University and
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of 1981, one has to consider what might have been passed in its place.
If nothing had been passed if no tax reduction had been enacted in
1981--would the 1980s have been a boom period? Is it possible that a
more balanced macroeconomic mix of tighter budgets and easier money
would have done the job? Or do we owe the good times of the eighties,
at least in part, to unintended Keynesian policy at the beginning of the
decade?
The same should be asked of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Without
the 1986 legislation, how much bigger would the boom and bust have
been, and where would we be now? It is important to build these counter-
factual assumptions into any analysis of the effects of legislation.
From a structural point of view, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 brought
considerable gains in efficiency. Poterba acknowledges these gains, but
his paper is more concerned with the short-term effects of the legisla-
tion. I would point out, however, that gains were made not only in
efficiency, but also in equity.
While recognizing these gains, Poterba questions whether, in sum,
the 1986 legislation was wise. He speaks of "tax shelter fever," and not
"beating" people when they are down. No one wants to do the latter,
but I would suggest that it is an error to think that one can have tax
reforms such as the 1986 legislation at will, nicely timed to avoid any
upheaval. The opportunity comes rarely, perhaps once in a few de-
cades, when major economic reform can be undertaken. And 1986 just
happened to be that time.
Circumstances Leading up to the Legislation
The tax reform movement which fueled the 1986 reform really
extends back to the work of Henry C. Simons in the 1940s. Over the
decades from the 1940s to the 1980s, my generation of tax analysts
pleaded for improvement of the income tax, to make it fairer by
"leveling the playing field." The mid 1980s seemed to offer that
possibility. At the end of the Carter Administration, the Treasury
produced Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform. This was followed in the mid
1980s by two more Treasury reports advocating tax reform, the second
more cautious than the first. Political support for reform grew in the
Treasury, the Congress, and the White House.
Although the legislation that was passed fell short of the original
vision, it accomplished a great deal--much more than most thought was
conceivable or practical. The legislation brought to fruition decades of
thinking about broadening the tax base. Everyone involved was so
pleased that such reform could be pushed through the political estab-
lishment that the short-run effects on housing markets were not consid-260 Richard A. Musgrave
ered. The goal was to establish a level playing field and then for the next
500 years have a perfect income tax.
These events hold a lesson for tax policy. Basic tax reforms cannot
always be enacted at the time when they are most convenient. Short-run
effects will not always be favorable. This is true not only for tax reform.
Another example is the North American Free Trade Agreement. The
immediate dislocations created by free trade with Mexico will fall on
those people whose wages are now down. Nevertheless, the agreement
offers long-term benefits, and the appropriate response to such disloca-
tions is to find measures to deal with the short-run inequities.
Fixing the Problems in Real Estate Markets
The current difficulties in real estate markets and financial institu-
tions will not be remedied by a return to providing tax shelter oppor-
tunities; these would only lay the basis for a new boom and bust
movement. Any remedies must maintain the more level playing field
that now exists. Structural adjustments are occurring within the indus-
try, and they are needed.
Of course, when one considers possible improvements, eliminating
the deductibility of mortgage interest comes to mind. But this provision
of the tax code remains almost untouchable, especially considering the
current debate over family values. Nor should it be assumed that
preferential treatment of housing could be avoided under an expendi-
ture tax. The opposite may be the case.
Conclusion: Capital Formation versus
Consumer Goods
To conclude, a word on the general relationship between the
construction industry and capital formation. In the national income
accounts, capital formation is defined as economic activity
that produces something durable, something tangible. There are two
difficulties with this. First, it takes in only physical assets and ignores
the importance of human capital. Second, a genuine focus on economic
growth requires that one distinguish between the various types of
so-called capital goods. Housing is a durable good, but it is a durable
consumer good. Savings directed into housing are diverted from plant
and equipment. And of course it is plant and equipment that increase
productivity, support innovation, and generate growth. Housing expen-
ditures have no more effect upon the long-run growth of productivity
than expenditures on short-run consumption.DISCUSSION 261
If tax shelter opportunities were to be reestablished, they should be
directed towards generating investment that will increase productivity.
In that context, housing does not rate very highly. Affordable housing is
different, not because it involves capital formation, but because it
represents an in-kind transfer to low-income people. In sum, policy-
makers should not attempt to resolve the productivity problem by
reopening tax shelters.